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RACE TO HEALTH: RACIALIZED DISCOURSES IN A
TRANSHUMAN WORLD
Lisa C. Ikemoto*
I. INTRODUCTION
We are at an interesting moment in biomedicine. After a long absence
as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry, race is back. Science had
long been used to support institutionalized racial hierarchy in the U.S.
and Europe. Notions of biological race or inherent race-based
biological differences have been used to justify war, slavery, harmful
effects of industrialization, segregation, immigration restrictions,
eugenics, and population control. It took the Nazis to discredit
biological race in the U.S.' After World War II, biomedical science
backed off of race. Race, instead, became the subject of social
science.: Social scientists helped us understand that race is formed as a
result of a sociopolitical process - racialization.3 Civil rights activists
helped us realize race as a political identity that can become a platform
for organizing against racial subjugation.4
But race is back on the biomedical research agenda. As a result,
biological race is emerging as a legitimized explanation for medical
5and social issues. In the context of health care, the use of race as a
diagnostic tool, as a pharmaceutical-marketing tool, and as a basis for
identifying and tracking health disparities may seem benign. But two
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Visiting Professor, U.C. Davis School of
Law (2004-2006). I would like to thank research assistants Susie Yoon and Ellie
Gladstone for their diligent work. I gratefully acknowledge the summer research
fellowship from Loyola Law School, and the funding for research assistants provided
by U.C. Davis School of Law. Most of all, I thank Scott and Kazu for their love and
patience.
1 ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
RACE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1 (1992),
TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 4 (2d ed. 2003).
2 BARKAN, supra note 1, at 342; WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS
OF RACIAL RESEARCH 138 (1994).
3 See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994).
4 See HOWARD WINANT, THE WORLD IS A GHETTO: RACE AND DEMOCRACY SINCE
WORLD WAR II 158-64 (2001).
5 JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES, BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
RACE AT THE MILLENIUM 156 (2001), HOWARD WNANT, THE WORLD IS A GHETTO
151 (2001).
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things should give us pause. Historically, biological race has only been
used to justify subordination and segregation. It has served no benign
purpose. In addition, the emerging explanatory power of biological
race follows closely in time the resurrection of eugenics as a medical
and social practice.6
Against this background, a debate about the desirability of
transhumanism - the use of biotechnology to enhance human mental
and physical capacities - has formed. Proponents of transhumanism
point to the hope that science could substantially prolong human life,
make us smarter, and free of genetic defects. Others worry that new
technologies will also be used to for social control, for eugenic
purposes, or that in the process of enhancing ourselves, humans will
lose the experiential or other basis that makes us "human." Proponents
and opponents have alternately framed transhumanism as the next
frontier and a no-human's land. The debate, in part, reflects hopes and
fears about the role of science in society, differences in ways of
defming progress and the boundaries of humanness, and varying
degrees of faith in our governing institutions.
Not surprisingly, the debate is framed in nearly exclusively
modernist terms. Perhaps just as unsurprising is that while participants
in the debate address the possibility that enhancement technology use
could create inequalities between the enhanced and the not-enhanced,
the debate barely addresses the possibility that a transhumanist world
may be a racist world. Nor does the debate consider the role that
biological race may play in this world.
If there is anything we have learned about the power of
racialization is that it is far- reaching. As ahistorical as transhumanism
may seem, novel uses of biotechnology and their potential to
reformulate our understandings of humanity and human will not
necessarily and finally disrupt the power of racialization. Nor will the
apparent race-neutrality of the transhumanist debate make the future so.
Enhancement technology use is already intertwined with racial
ideology, including the notion of biological race.
The formation of biomedical knowledge takes place in a socio-
political context that shapes it content. In other words, science is an
interpretive process and therefore, a product of cultural, social and
political forces. 7 Biology, and genetics in particular, are often, and in
6 TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 4-5 (2d ed. 2003).
7 See SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); EVELYN Fox
KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1984), EVELYN Fox KELLER,
REFIGURING LIFE: METAPHORS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY BIOLOGY (1995). See also
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discourse, always, ideological. 8  These interrelated points do not
contradict the results of science. Instead, they "challenge the notion
that science and its discoveries are exempt from ideology critique,
deconstruction, or historical investigation that might be trained on any
other discourse: literature and art, politics, social scientific theory, and
so forth." 9
The purpose of this essay is to expose the racialized content of
the mainstream debate about transhumanism, and to suggest that we
may be able to use transhumanism's challenges to modernist
ideological structures to counter enhancement technologies worst
possible uses. In Part II, I sketch the re-emergence of biological race,
and concerns it has raised about genetic essentialism and eugenics. In
Part III, I use literary and popular culture texts and a few of the most
influential participants in the transhumanist debate to illustrate how the
issues of enhancement technology use are being framed and addressed.
I point out that race and racism are curiously absent in the debate,
especially given the vigor of the discourse over biological race. In
addition, I show how the debate frames the issues and solutions in
wholly modernist terms. I, then, address the irony of addressing the
possibilities of posthumanism in modernist terms, and argue that
transhumanism, when viewed through a postmodern lens, may be used
to challenge modernist social constructions that maintain inequality. In
Part IV, I forecast a future for transhumanism made predictable by
current racist practices. I then suggest that progressives may be
undermined by their own reflexive oppositionality and use of
essentialized notions of identity and community. I argue that
postmodernism can make itself relevant in the transhumanist debate by
rejecting an anti-science, anti-technology stance, and instead
participating in the formation of scientific knowledge and technology
use by building what sociologist Stanley Aronowitz has called "a new
CHARLES ALAN TAYLOR, DEFINING SCIENCE: A RHETORIC OF DEMARCATION (1996);
DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS
CULTURAL ICON (1995);
8 See generally R.C. LEWONTN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA
(1991); R.C. LEWONTN, STEVEN ROSE & LEON J. KAMIN, NOT IN OUR GENES:
BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE (1984); DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN
L1NDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON 5-11(1995). See also
Andrew Ross, Introduction, in SCIENCE WARS 1-5(Andrew Ross ed. 1996); Sarah
Kember, Reinventing Cyberfeminism: Cyberfeminism and the New Biology, 31
ECONOMY & SOCIETY 626, 628 (2002).
9 Stanley Aronowitz, Politics of the Science Wars, in SCIENCE WARS, supra note 8, at
202, 205-06.
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scientific citizenship," that uses political organizing as a primary
strategy.
II. THE RETURN TO RACE
Biological race, as well as the standard anti-racist responses to it, have
returned to biomedical research. In the past, researchers have
compared observed differences in skin color, skeletal structure, tactile
sensitivity, genital size, disease susceptibility, mental defectiveness,
hair follicle structure, mortality rates, and other "evidence" to support
claims of inherent racial superiority/inferiority.' 0  Today, it all rides
upon the gene. And both those who claim and those who refute the
truth and efficacy of biological race use genetic knowledge as their
evidence.
The gene has become the unified theory of the moment.
Biomedical science casts the gene as the code, the blueprint, the bible
of life." Researchers are pursuing the genetic bases for diseases and
disabilities, for indicators of health and ability such as longevity and
fertility, and most disturbingly -- given our eugenic past, behavior.
12
Outside of science, the explanatory power of the gene may be even
more expansive. In popular culture - movies, entertainment television,
news media, literature - the romance and horror of the gene have
become staples. The degree to which the gene has perfused our
consciousness is suggested by the recent publication of non-science
fiction literature in which genetic cloning technology provides context,
not subject matter.' 3
The appeal of a single, direct causative agent for life and its
variations is vast. 14 The appeal is so strong that we often reject, in its
10 WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 9-33
(1994).
l See DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS
CULTURAL ICON 6-8 (1995) (discussing the range of metaphors used and the power
they attribute to DNA).
12 See, e.g., TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 98-103 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing as problematic research to locate a genetic basis for criminal behavior). A
recently published study examined the correlation between genetics, social
orientation, and political beliefs. See Benedict Carey, Some Politics May Be Etched
in the Genes, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at DI.
13 See, e.g., KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME Go (2005).
14 See R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA 41- 42
(describing and critiquing the assumption in biology that "one looks for the cause of
an effect, or even if there are a number of causes allowed, one supposes that there is a
major cause and the others are only subsidiary. And in any case, these causes are
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favor, attempts to add refinement, detail, nuance, and complexity to the
theory. We cling, instead, to the reductionist version of genetics. It is,
after all, not only easier to understand, but also offers predictability,
certainty, and absolution from responsibility. The discoveries of
genetic science neither fully support nor significantly undermine the
power of the gene. DNA has taken on a life of its own in the public
imaginary. It feeds off of but does not depend on scientific validation.
One of the major proclamations issued from the Human
Genome Project was that each of us is a 99.9% genetic match with the
other, and that the genetic variation among the recognized racial
populations is smaller than that between any two individuals.' 5 It
would appear, therefore, that race-based genetic differences are
insignificant. The issue then becomes, what do we make of this
information? Geneticists and other researchers have contested the
issue. 16 Some would ban the use of race in research. 17 Others find race
useful. Or, more specifically, they claim that there is a sufficient
correlation between popular continent-based concepts of race and
separated from each other, studied independently, and manipulated and interfered
with in an independent way." (emphasis in original)).
15 Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification and
"Race, " 36 NATURE GENETICS S28 (2004); Mark Henderson, Gene Tests Prove That
We Are All the Same Under the Skin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, Home News, at 16.
("The human genome map has shown that if two people of any ethnic origin are
selected at random, only between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 1,500 of their genes will differ.
This makes our species among the most homogeneous known to science: populations
of chimpanzees and fruit flies differ much more from one another in genetic terms. A
typical Caucasian's genes will be as similar -and as different - to those of another
Caucasian as they will be to a black African or a Chinese person. About 90 per cent of
genetic variation occurs within ethnic groups, rather than between them. Two
Africans, though both superficially "black", will differ more from one another than
from other races. This reflects the course of evolution.").
16 See, e.g., Genetics for the Human Race, 36 NATURE GENETICS S1 (2004) (this
entire issue of Nature Genetics was dedicated to the issue of whether there is a genetic
basis for race and whether using racial categories was a useful and desirable way of
pursuing genetic bases for disease). Geneticists and other scholars presented a wide
range of views on the issues.) See id. See also Special Issue: Genes, Race, and
Psychology in the Genome Era, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (2005) (a special issue of
American Psychologist, in which researchers discuss racial health disparities and the
controversial area of intelligence and also delimit the ways in which race should and
should not be used).
17 See Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36
ARIZONA STATE L.J. 1093 (2004).
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genetic variation to justify using race as a proxy.' 8 Some would use
race, but with caution. 9 Others would shift the focus to genetic
variation itself,2 ° or to the role of environmental factors and the effects
of racism on social and economic structures.2'
What seems to be at stake is identity. The extreme version of
the unified theory posits the gene as the essence of identity. This
conclusion rests on a reductive precept. Genetic essentialism
characterizes the person or population first and foremost in terms of
genetic content, or perhaps more accurately, selected genetic content.
22
In a broad sense, genetic essentialism operates like racial stereotyping.
It takes a fixed physical trait and interpolates socially constructed
meaning to the exclusion of self and agency. Merging genetic
essentialism with the use of race as a proxy for genetic variation is
producing a form of biological race made particularly strong by its
association with genetics. 23 The resulting reproduction of biological
race would reinforce preexisting notions of racial difference. It might
even generate new stereotypes. At the least, it would reduce the
possibility of using the finding of 99.9% genetic overlap to understand
ourselves as more interconnected than different.
18 See, e.g., Joanna L. Mountain & Neil Risch, Assessing Genetic Contributions to
Phenotypic Differences Among "Racial" and "Ethnic" Groups, 36 NATURE
GENETICS 48 (2004).
'9 See, e.g., Sarah K. Tate & David B. Goldstein, Will Tomorrow's Medicines Work
for Everyone?, 36 NATURE GENETICS 34 (2004). See also Marshall H. Chin &
Catherine A. Huminowski, When is Risk Stratification by Race or Ethnicity Justified
in Medical Care?, 77 ACAD. MED. 202 (2002). See generally Erik Liliquist, The Law
and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391
(2004).
20 See, e.g., Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification
and "Race", 36 NATURE GENETICS 28 (2004).
21 See, e.g., Richard Cooper & Richard David, The Biological Concept of Race and
its Application to Public Health and Epidemiology, 11 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y &
L. 97, 106 (1986); Pamela Sankar et al., Genetic Research and Health Disparities,
291 JAMA 2985, 2988 (2004). See also Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meanings of
"Race " in the New Genomics." Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 33, 54-55 (2001).
22 DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 2, 149-68 (1995) (citing Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, March
20, 1989, at 62-67).
23 See BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE BOOK OF LIFE: A PERSONAL AND ETHICAL
GUIDE TO RACE, NORMALITY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT xiii ("The science of genetics is not a racist science: but the ideology of
genetic determinism, of a predetermined set of qualities passed from genotype to
phenotype, from the DNA to the person, supports much that is racist in our society.").
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There is a second precept in operation. As James Watson,
winner with Francis Crick for their discovery of the double helix
structure of DNA, has said, "our fate is in our genes. 24  Genetic
determinism assumes that our genes have the power of prophesy and
that our DNA presets who and what we can become.25  Not
surprisingly, genetic determinism can slip easily into genetic
26discrimination. It only requires an appraisal of genetic worthiness
and an accompanying action or failure to act. In a society that
reflexively assigns value to difference, genetic discrimination seems
inevitable.
Thus far, law and policy have addressed the risk of genetic
discrimination by calling for genetic privacy or protection of genetic
information.27 The call for genetic privacy is based on the concern that
employers, insurers, and others will make employment and coverage
decisions based on identified or assumed genetic risk for specific
diseases or disabilities. 28 Advocates for genetic privacy laws claim that
genetic information needs special protection because we assign greater
significance to genetic information than other health information.
29
24 DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 7 (1995) (citing Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, March 20, 1989,
at 62-67).
25 R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY 23 (1991).
26 See generally R.C. LEWONTIN, STEVEN ROSE & LEON J. KAMIN, NOT IN OUR
GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 68-74 (1984).
27 See George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4 TEX. REV.
LAW & POL. 7 (1999); Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination
Exceptional, 29 AM. J. L. AND MED. 77 (2003). See generally GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA (Mark A.
Rothstein ed. 1997); Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy:
Comparing the Medical, Public Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221,278-79 (2001).
28 See generally GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN
THE GENETIC ERA (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual
Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical, Public Health, and
Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 278-281 (2001); Deborah
Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrmination Exceptional, 29 AM. J.L. AND MED. 77,
77 (2003); Robyn B. Nicoll, Long-Term Care Insurance and Genetic Discrimination
- Get it While You're Young and Ignorant: An Examination of Current Discrminatory
Problems in Long-Term Care Insurance Through the Use of Genetic Information, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 751, 758 (2003).
29 See LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 250-51 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds.,
2003); George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4 TEX. REV.
LAW & POL. 7, 12 (1999); George J. Annas, Editorial, Genetic Prophecy and Genetic
Privacy: Can We Prevent the Dream from Becoming a Nightmare?, 85 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1196, 1196 (1995); Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic Information
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Advocates recognize the central dynamic of genetic essentialism and
genetic determinism - the over-signification of genetic information.
To the extent that we understand genes to be the bases for
health/illness, genetic determinism prophesies our physical fates.
However, it may be genetic discrimination, not the truth of the
prophesy, that seals it. As the unified theory of the gene expands to
include skills, aptitudes, and behaviors, genetic determinism becomes a
prediction about who and what one can become as a person. Value
judgments will inevitably follow. The greatest fear expressed thus far
is that we will revive our past, our eugenic past. 30  Scholars 3' and
activists32 have documented the ways in which those judgments have
already been operationalized. According to Troy Duster, a new era of
eugenics has entered by the backdoor.33
Duster argues that social concerns, not the unified theory of the
gene are driving the new eugenics. 34 In particular, he argues that there
is an interlocking relationship between the status of genetics,
demographic and economic change, and the construct of race. "Then,
just at the point in the intellectual history of the West when "race" was
getting to be treated in both scientific and enlightened lay quarters as
something no more than skin-deep, just when the social sciences
thought they had won the battle with hereditarians over the
fundamentally arbitrary importance of race in society, a new
development came along to shake this assumption at its core: the
growth of a body of research showing that genetic disorders were
Separately is a Bad Idea, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 33 (1999) (arguing that genetic
information is not unique in comparison to other health information).
30 See generally DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS (1985); WENDY
KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM (2001) (discussing accounts of eugenics
in the 1 9 th and 20th centuries,); JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM 86-139 (2001);
WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 36-137
(1994); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925 (1955) (discussing accounts of the impacts of eugenics on immigrants).
31 See, e.g., TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (2d ed. 2003); Jason
Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 12 (2002); John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring
Characteristics, 76 B.U.L. REv. 421 (1996); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 439 (2003).
32 See generally Center for Genetics and Society, http://www.genetics-and-
society.org (last visited September 30, 2005).
33 DUSTER, supra note 31, at 114-13 1.
34 Id. at 6-20, 138-45.
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distributed differently through different racial and ethnic groups. 35
Although Duster's thesis is yet premised on the scientific status of
genetic knowledge that is the heart of the unified theory of the gene, his
argument suggests that we focus not on the science, but on the
formation of racial politics.
36
III. TRANSHUMANISM AND BIOPOLITICS: A CURIOUS
ABSENCE OF RACE
Science Fictions
Reading about transhumanism triggers memories, the kind made from
television and movie viewing, and science fiction reading.
Frankenstein was first. Many regard Mary Shelley's novel of the
scientist who reconstitutes life from body parts of the dead as the
foundation novel of science fiction literature. 37  Since then,
"Frankenstein" has become pop culture short hand for the perils of
"playing god" or using science to exceed the bounds of "nature."
Similarly, Nathaniel Hawthorne's, The Birthmark38 and H.G. Well's,
The Island of Dr. Moreau39 contain storylines about scientists who go
too far. In The Birthmark, the scientist Aylmer cannot simply
appreciate his wife's love and remarkable beauty. He is driven to use
his knowledge to remove what he perceives to be Georgianna's one
imperfection, a birthmark. In the process, he removes that which made
her human, and she dies. In The Island of Doctor Moreau, Dr. Moreau
commits atrocities to surgically create cross-species, animal-human
hybrids with extraordinary combinations of ability, but ravaged natures.
In the stories both scientists transgress boundaries of "nature" and
"humanity" that transhumanism likewise brings into question.
Pop culture teems with characters about those who are no
longer simply human. Those of us who watched television in the 1970s
can recite from memory the opening voiceover of The Six Million
Dollar Man.40 "We can build him... We have the technology. We
have the capability to make the world's first Bionic man. Steve Austin
will be that man. Better than he was before. Better . stronger...
35 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
36 1d. at 137-45.
37 See generally CARL D. MALMGREN, WORLDS APART: NARRATOLOGY OF SCIENCE
FICTION (1991).
38 NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE BIRTHMARK (1846).
39 H.G. WELLS, THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU (1896).
40 See Spiderman, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071054/.
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,,4 1 42
faster. Steve Austin was my generation's first transhuman, and
once a week, he embodied the promise of science, and in particular, of
government-sponsored science.43
Unlike The Six Million Dollar Man, most of the newer stories
about transhumans are dark. The heroes live in worlds in which
scientific knowledge, however it originated, is primarily harmful. In
these stories, science is power. It degrades those who wield it and
those made object by it. It harms the environment. And it centralizes
authoritarian power to the point where the necessities of physical
survival have made morality, creativity, and individuality trivial. The
stories depict our worst fears of scientists, technocrats, and corporations
run amuck with science and technology-enhanced power. William
Gibson's Neuromancer,4 4 which ushered in cyberpunk as a science
fiction sub-genre45 and Bladerunner46 exemplify these stories.
Although these stories should not become guidebooks for
evaluating the ongoing debate about transhumanism, these cultural
references spring unavoidably to mind when considering the claims
being made in the debate. They stand as warnings or shorthand
arguments. "Frankenfood," for example, suggests the perils of
genetically modified agricultural products. 47 The stories or characters
41 See Memorable Quotes from Six Million Dollar Man,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071054/quotes.
42 See Spiderman, http://www.answers.com/topic/first-appearance- 1. Austin is the
first transhuman, unless you count Spiderman, a Marvel Comics character who
acquires superhuman powers after an irradiated spider bites him. Spiderman
originated in 1962 or 1963. That is, the character first appeared in 1962, but The
Amazing Spiderman comic book was first published in 1963. Thanks to friend and
Spiderman aficionado, Matt Yuen, for the Spiderman research.
43 While the allusion is admittedly ridiculous, The Six Million Dollar Man did stand
out in one respect. Androids, cyborgs, and technologically enhanced humans were
the exception during the 1970s. Space travel, time travel, and alien encounters were
much more typical of both the science fiction and action genres of the decade. That
said, it should be noted that both Alien and Star Wars had android characters.
44 WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
45 The Oxford English Dictionary defines cyberpunk as a "subgenre of science fiction
typified by a bleak, high-tech setting in which a lawless subculture exists within an
oppressive society dominated by computer technology; or, an author of, or
protagonist in, such writing." 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ADDITIONS SERIES
107 (Michael Proffitt ed., 1997).
46 The movie, Bladerunner (1982), directed by Ridley Scott, was based on Philip A.
Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968).
47 See Frankenfood, http://www.talkmedical.com/medical-
dictionary/5848/Frankenfood (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). The term is often used to
express concern that such foods will cause harm to those who eat them.
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that resonate with our fears, hopes or values may shape our responses
to the transhumanist proposition. We may use them to make points that
the authors may or may not have intended, thereby collaborating in the
process of interpretation. Or, we may dismiss the stories as mere
fiction, using them nonetheless to define our own "reality."
What is it about transhumanism that brings these particular
stories to mind? The transhumanist proposition is that we can and
should use biotechnology to enhance and alter human abilities.48
Transhumanism's proponents aim to use biotechnology to enhance the
healthy. The proposition challenges the boundaries we have used to
define medicine, natural, and human. It also assumes we can
distinguish between therapy and enhancement, natural and artificial,
human and more- or less-than human. Biotechnology, according to the
claims, could make us "better... stronger... faster. ' 49 It could double
the human lifespan and make us smarter. Ability and appearance
would depend on technology access and use, as well as inborn ability,
training and opportunity, thus challenging our notions of merit,
competition, and fair play, and hopefully prompting re-evaluation of
the standards used to police those notions, as well.
We have already begun to address the issues. Professional (and
amateur) sports and Hollywood are the most well-known sites of
enhancement technology use.50 In recent years, sports pages and even
congressional hearings have featured accounts of steroid,
methamphetamine, blood transfusion, and EPO use.51 Entertainment
industry reporting frequently refers to face lifts, nose jobs, breast
augmentations, collagen and BOTOX use. In sports, current rules of
the game penalize certain performance enhancers as unsafe and
48 See ALAN BUCHANAN, DAN W. BROCK, NORMAN DANIELS & DANIEL WIKLER,
FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE, GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); JAMES HUGHES, CITIZEN
CYBORG: WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST RESPOND TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN
OF THE FUTURE (2004); RAMEZ NAAM, MORE THAN HUMAN: EMBRACING THE
PROMISE OF BIOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT (2005); GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING
HUMANS, OUR INEVITABLE GENETIC FUTURE (2002).
49 See Memorable Quotes from Six Million Dollar Man,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071054/quotes.
50 These are not the only uses, of course. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, The Adderall
Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, §4A, at 16 (describing college students
widespread use of prescription stimulants such as Adderall and Ritalin to enhance
academic performance).
51 See RAMEZ NAAM, MORE THAN HUMAN: EMBRACING THE PROMISE OF
BIOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT 20-24 (2005).
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unfair.52  In the rest of the entertainment industry, appearance
enhancers are simply tools of the trade. In both arenas, the technology
use has placed the meanings and value of "natural" ability and beauty
into play.
Though the transhumanist forecast clearly includes
pharmaceutical use, it also depends heavily on genetic technology,
information technology, and the more recently emerged
nanotechnology. For example, the gold standard in pharmaceuticals
right now is a memory-enhancing drug without debilitating side
effects. 53 But the dream standard is gene therapy or the insertion of
genetic material that the patient's genome incorporates, which then
prompts the patient's body to produce the desired chemical on its
own.54 Genetic engineering figures in other steps to transhumanism, as
well. Current lab research shows that relatively simple gene alterations
can significantly extend the lifespan of nematodes and mice, 5 which
suggests that genetic manipulation might also increase the human
lifespan. Prebirth genetic selection is one of the most controversial and
slippery topics. Existing technology such as amniocentesis and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) allows the pre-birth identification
of gender and the absence of specific disease risks.56  Prospective
parents could also use PGD to select pre-embryos created in vitro for
desirable traits before pregnancy. In the future, genetic engineering
might allow for the creation of specified traits in pre-implanted
embryos. "Designer babies," the shorthand used for this topic, raises
questions about artificiality and superficiality in the process and results
of the technology use.57
Other technologies challenge our understanding of "human," as
well as our standards for "natural." Electronic brain implants to create
52 Erin F. Floyd, Comment, The Modern Athlete: Natural Athletic Ability or
Technology at its Best?, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 155, 156 (2002).
53 See NAAM, supra note 48, at 48.
54 See HUGHES, supra note 48, at 38-41; NAAM, supra note 48, at 19.
55 See NAAM, supra note 48, at 82-84
56 Jason Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002
DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 12, 7 (2002),
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/PDF/2002DLTR0012.pdf.
57 Leon R. Kass, Triumph or Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology,
45 AM. J. JuRis. 1, 9-11 (2000); John A. Robertson, PROCREATIVE LIBERTY IN THE
ERA OF GENOMICs, 29 AM. J. L. AND MED. 439, 475; Caroline S. Wagner,
Commentary, The Weapons of Mass Creation: Are We Ready for Genetically
Enhanced "Designer People"? If so, Who Will Make the Titanic Decisions
Involved?, L.A. TIMES (California Metro), Feb. 13, 2003, at 23.
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human to computer interaction are in development now.58
Nanotechnology might be used in the future to develop molecular-level
robots to boost our immune systems or extend our lifespans.59 The
cyborg is approaching. While we seem to accept bovine and porcine to
human tissue transplants, the prospect of using stem cell technology to
create chimeras - organisms with cells or genes from two or more
species, including humans.
60
One utopian vision of the future might imagine the eradication
of genetic disease, disability, and defect. All would be smarter,
stronger, faster, and longer-lived. In this vision, transhumanism would
completely supplant natural selection, accelerate the timeline for
species improvement, and remove the element of chance. 61 It would, in
fact, put us "on the cusp of what may prove to be our final evolutionary
stage, ' '62 or, in an alternative version, position us as "the initiators of
this new genesis. ' '63 In all visions, the enhanced humans would be the
result of a level of technological intervention not practiced today, and
only imagined earlier, in fiction.
Biopolitics
Many of the arguments for, against, and about transhumanism address a
wide range of issues and express a range of views. Some examine the
boundary issues. Others address safety, access, eugenic concerns, and
implications for autonomy and equality. The views cannot accurately
58 See NAAM, supra note 48, at 181-87.
59 John Miller, Note, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of Nanomedicine, 4
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. (2003), available at
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume4/niller.pdf (last visited November 17, 2005);
Aubrey de Gray, Increasing Health and Longevity of Human Life: Infectious
Diseases, http://www.foresight.org/challenges/health002.html (last visited August 8,
2005); Aubrey de Gray, Increasing Health and Longevity of Human Life: The
Postponement of Aging, http://www.foresight.org/challenges/health001.html (last
visited August 8, 2005).
60 Mark Jagels, Note, Dr. Moreau Has Left the Island: Dealing with Human-Animal
Patents in the 21s Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 115, 122-124 (2000); Nicole E.
Kopinski, NOTE, HUMAN-NONHUMAN CHIMERAS: A REGULATORY PROPOSAL ON THE
BLURRING OF SPECIES LINES, 5 B.C.L. REv. 619, 624-626 (2004); Mark Henderson,
Fear over Human-Animal Embryos, TIMES, August 16, 2005, at 20; Eleanor Mayne,
Scientists Creating Monkeys with Human Brains, MAIL ON SUNDAY, July 10, 2005,
§3, at 41.
61 See NAAM, supra note 48, at 233.
62 Francoise Bayliss & Jason Scott Robert, The Inevitability of Genetic Enhancement
Technologies, 18 BIOETHICS 1-26, 25 (2004).
63 See NAAM, supra note 48, at 234.
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be divided into support and opposition. 64  Many who support
enhancement technology would also embrace its regulation. And many
who would substantially limit the use of enhancement technology
would oppose outright bans. A less inaccurate initial distinction, if one
is to be made, might be between proponents optimistic about a
transhumanist future, and critics more skeptical about the effects of
transhumanism on individuals and society. The biopolitical spectrum,
if you will, is fairly broad. Proponents include those expressing
libertarian, 65 liberal,66 including pro-choice liberal feminist 67 and leftist
viewpoints. 68 Critics have used liberal,69 socially conservative, 70 and
socially progressive, 71 including progressive feminist 72 arguments.
64 But see JAMES HUGHES, CITIZEN CYBORG, WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST
RESPOND TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN OF THE FUTURE 75 (2004). Hughes
distinguishes between Bio-Luddites and Transhumanists. In Hughes' analysis, the
distinction is between those who insist that we remain "human" and those who insist
that the goal is "personhood."
65 See, e.g., RAMEZ NAAM, MORE THAN HUMAN: EMBRACING THE PROMISE OF
BIOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT (2005); GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING HUMANS: OUR
INEVITABLE GENETIC FUTURE (2002); JULIAN SAVULESCU, PROCREATIVE
BENEFICENCE: WHY WE SHOULD SELECT THE BEST CHILDREN, 15 BIOETHICS 413-26
(2001).
66 See, e.g., JAMES HUGHES, CITIZEN CYBORG: WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST
RESPOND TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN OF THE FUTURE (2004).
67 See NARAL Pro Choice America, Science and Women's Health,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/Issues/science/index.cfm; WILLIAM SALETAN,
BEARING RIGHT: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR 271-73 (2003).
See also NOW, Below the Belt: Skirting the Rules again,
http://www.now.org/news/note/120304.html; CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND
POLICY, Reproductive Freedom News, at
http://www.reproductiverights.org/rfn 00 12.html; PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
Donating Fetal Tissue for Medical Treatment and Research,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/porta/files/portal/medicalinfo/abortion/fact-
01 0600-fetaltis.xml..
68 See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND
JUSTICE (2000).
69 See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES:
GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY (2003).
70 See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY:
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (2003), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/beyond-therapy final-webcorrected
.pdf.
71 See generally UCLA CENTER FOR SOCIETY AND GENETICS,
http://www.societyandgenetics.ucla.edu (last visited September 29, 2005).
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Thinking about the role of race in unequal health care gives rise
to two observations about the transhumanist debate. First, there is a
curious absence of race, particularly on the proponent-side of the
debate. This absence is made notable by the return of biological race in
genetic discourse, and recent attention to the role of racism in health
status and health care.
73
My second observation may help explain the absence of race.
The debate about transhumanism is taking place almost exclusively
within a modernist framework. The terms of engagement use notions
of autonomy, choice, and equality in a world in which individuals act
on, not within particular social contexts. Proponents and critics express
a faith in human progress even as they contest the direction of that goal.
They assume the existence of universal moral principles, 74 but debate
the details. Modernist analysis uses several mechanisms to cabin race
and racism. But generally speaking, the modernist analysis locates
racism in specific wrong-minded individuals and in particular
institutional structures, standards, and practices. Modernists, therefore,
recognize that racism is pervasive and historically-rooted. They fail,
however, to appreciate or even see how integral race-based valuations
and associations are to cultural formations, including our standards for
and perceptions of common sense,75  ability,
76  and illness. 7 7
72 For example, Pro Choice Feminists for Responsible Research support stem cell
research, but call for regulations to protect women's health, autonomy, and to call for
distributional justice in technology access.
73 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003); Rene
Bowser, Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Medical Care, 30 BRIEF 24
(Summer 2001). Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial Disparities in Health Care and Cultural
Competency, 48 ST. Louis U.L.J. 75, 75 (2003); Barbara A. Noah, Racist Health
Care?, 48 FLA. L. REv. 357 (1996); Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the
Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 135, 154-56 (1998); David Barton
Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil Rights Monitoring and
Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 75, 77 (1998); Sidney D. Watson, Race,
Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 203
(2001); Symposium, Unequal Treatment: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health
Care, 48 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (2003); Symposium, Disentangling Fact From Fiction:
The Realities of Unequal Health Care Treatment, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1
(2006).
74 See Margrit Shildrick, Genetics, Normativity, and Ethics: Some Bioethical
Concerns, 5 FEMINIST THEORY 149, 150 (2004), Teresa Heffernan, Bovine Anxieties,
Virgin Births, and the Secret of Life, 53 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 116, 117 (2003).
75 See Stuart Alan Clarke, Fear of a Black Planet: Race, Identity Politics and
Common Sense, 21 SOCIALIST REv. 37 (1991).
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Modernism makes most forms of racism either invisible or irrelevant.78
Race-neutrality or colorblindness is feasible within this framework. So,
a modernist could write about the future without ever acknowledging
the centrality of racial formation in our lives.
In one of the most recent books about transhumanism,
transhumanism proponent Ramez Naam discusses the potential use of
gene therapy to darken skin for the purposes of creating resistance to
skin cancer. He describes the lab work on mice that changed the fur of
albino mice from white to brown, their eyes from pink to black, and
then back to albino again. In this discussion, the closest Naam gets to
mentioning race is the statement, "[p]ale skin is a risk factor for skin
cancer." 79 That is, in fact, his closest approach to race in the entire
book. Bouyant optimism characterizes Naam's analysis. He responds
to Bill McKibben8 0 and Leon Kass,8 1 two of the most severe critics
who invoke traditional concepts of "natural" and "human," and who
predict in different ways that eliminating those boundaries will result in
environmental and humanitarian degradation. Naam rejects the
biological essentialism inherent in those views and asserts that what
makes us human is the need to "reach beyond our grasp." 82 He deploys
the grand explorer as the defining figure of our evolutionary progress
thus far and of our inevitable progress in the future.
76 See Jeffrey C. Kirby, Disability and Justice: A Pluralistic Account, 30 SOCIAL
THEORY & PRACTICE 229 (2004).
77 See, e.g.. ELIZABETH FEE, SIN VERSUS SCIENCE: VENEREAL DISEASE IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY BALTIMORE, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 121, 127
(Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988) (explicating how syphilis came to be
construed as a "black disease"); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 22 (1981) (discussing the conflation of racist beliefs about
Black sexual behavior with disease causation); MATTHEW GANDY, LIFE WITHOUT
GERMS: CONTESTED EPISODES IN THE HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS, in THE RETURN OF
THE WHITE PLAGUE: GLOBAL POVERTY AND THE 'NEW" TUBERCULOSIS 28-30
(Matthew Gandy & Alimuddein Zumla eds., 2003) (describing the interpolation of
middle-class anxiety over immigration and race-mixing in the United States into
explanations for differences in morbidity and mortality rates by race and class); PAUL
FARMER, AIDS AND ACCUSATION: HAITI AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME (1993)
(assessing, in part, the American cultural trait of dealing with problems by blame-
placing and that trait's role in incorrectly identifying Haiti as the source of HIV).
78 See Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329-44 (1987).
79 NAAM, supra note 48 at 29.
80 Bill McKibben authored Enough: Staying Human in an EngineeredAge.
8 1 Leon Kass, a bioethicist, has chaired the President's Council on Bioethics for the
past few years, and is usually characterized as a social conservative.
82 NAAM, supra note 48, at 228.
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"We owe everything about our current lives to our
predecessors on this earth, the ones who would not stand
for "enough" and instead asked, "What next?" Those
brave, foolhardy inventors and explorers sought out better
ways to live .... If we can never repay that debt, we can
perhaps pay it forward to future generations. We cannot
perfectly predict, may not even be able to imagine, the
ways that our descendants will put the technologies we
develop to use. Yet the lesson of history is that they
will use the powers we provide them to make their world a
better place. Now it's time to do what past generations
did for us, to explore the world. ..,83
Naam's vision of the future is appealing, and seems at first,
transcendant. "We will not all opt for the same changes... Some of us
will choose to stay as we are, while others will chose to transform.
Humanity will expand, splinter, and blossom... these descendants of
ours will be fantastically diverse." 84  But Naam's most basic
assumption is of the universally sovereign subject who acts on, but not
in social contexts. Modernism binds his analysis and his vision for the
future.
One of the most influential critics of transhumanism, Francis
Fukuyama, also points to history. Fukuyama, however, uses history to
explain "why we should worry." "Hanging over the entire field of
genetics has been the specter of eugenics.' '85 Fukuyama distinguishes
past eugenic practices in the U.S. from those emerging now, but he
takes seriously the "dehumanizing potential" of genetic engineering. 86
Like Naam, Fukuyama argues that an essential human nature exists, but
posits a human moral sense as the constant.8 7 While Naam seems to
simply assume that we are all equal in an unregulated world, Fukuyama
defines the continuous struggle over who is human as central to human
history.88 In considering the future, he identifies the possibility, given
our history, that social elites will use genetic engineering to embed
their social advantages in their offspring, create a genetic overclass and
83 Id at 228-29.
84 Id. at 233.
85 FUKUYAMA, supra note 69, at 85.
86 Id. at 88.
87 Id at 102.
88 Id. at 150.
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exacerbate social hierarchy. 89  In Fukuyama's opinion, the only
alternative would be state-sponsored genetic engineering "to raise up
the bottom."90  And this, in his analysis, would resurrect state-
sponsored eugenics. 9' The solution, then, is to regulate, according to
principles of what he calls, "natural human rights."
Fukuyama doubts the survival of human nature in posthuman
world, 92 because he doubts the stability of human values in a world
where human difference becomes "real" - biologically-based. He
embraces human variety and describes the means to achieving equality
as inclusion, yet he fears the effects of unfettered choice. He
acknowledges existing social hierarchies and the risk that
transhumanist technology could exacerbate them. What he offers is a
direct response to libertarian proponents of transhumanism like Naam.
What he shares with them is a goal called human progress, to be
achieved by adherence to principles which, when universalized, lose
their content. Abstraction per se is not problematic. But applying
abstract principles requires interpretation. In the world of hierarchy
that Fukuyama acknowledges, the elites control interpretation, usually
at the expense of the non-elites. But at that last critical step, his
analysis becomes as acontextual as Naam's. Fukuyama's adherence to
"human values" as a constant is only possible in a world of status quo,
and it is the uncritical use of abstract universal principles without
regard to social context that help maintain status quo. Ultimately, by
failing to account for the effects of existing social context on his
constant, Fukuyama renders himself color-blind.
Postmodern Issues in Modernist Clothes
Transhumanism and its possibilities challenge, and even contradict
modernist assumptions. Humanism, within a modernist framework,
centers the body. The body is the locus for rights, dignity, and identity.
In bioethics, the most basic doctrine is informed consent. In a
modernist analysis, informed consent protects the linked values of
decisional autonomy and bodily integrity. Informed consent says that
the physical self constitutes the ultimate boundary between the self and
the state. Feminist theorists have shown the fallacy of the autonomous
patient by revealing how pre-existing social inequalities between
89 FUKUYAMA, supra note 69, at 157.
90 Id at 158.
9' Id. at 159.
92 Id. at 218.
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physician and patient are replicated in the informed consent process, 93
or how unconscious incorporation of gender stereotypes in the
decisionmaking process affects patient care. 94  Transhumanism
challenges the corporeal approach itself
Transhumanist proponents and critics have skirmished
awkwardly over the need to preserve various aspects of the human
body as we know it, or the effects of corporeal changes on human
essence.95 The technologies at issue, however, move the body out from
under us. Take, for example, genetics. Our faith in genetics has
changed the metaphors we use to describe the basis for life. The gene,
as mentioned, is the code, the blueprint, the bible of life. 96 The body
has become a set of codes.97  It is not that the body has become
irrelevant. The focus has shifted - the body is now the expression of
the basic unit of life, the gene. Identity resides primarily within our
DNA.
The modernist concept of an autonomous subject cannot
accommodate the shifts between biology and identity. Modernists
often contest the location of boundaries, but they rely on them
nonetheless, using binaries to set boundaries. 98  The autonomous
sovereign subject is typically defined in opposition to others. The
"others" have been and are at different times, animals, machines,
people of color, women, and nature.99  Francis Fukuyama
acknowledged the reliance on definitional binaries when he said that a
key contest in history has been the issue of who falls on which side of
human/other line. Transhumanist proponent James Hughes would
change the content of the binary to persons/other, but would embrace
the binary itself.'00 Yet the gene as code raises questions about who or
what is sovereign and who or what is subject.
Postmodern feminist Donna Haraway, has stated, "[h]igh tech
culture challenges these dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear
93 SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTERESTS 12 (1986).
94 See generally Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right
to Die, " 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
95 See GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING HUMANS: OUR INEVITABLE GENETIC FUTURE
19-34 (2002).
96 See infra n. 15.
97 Shildrick, supra note 74, at 150.
98 See Teresa Heffernan, BOVINE ANXIETIES, VIRGIN BIRTHS, AND THE SECRET OF
LIFE, 53 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 116, 118 (2003).
99 See Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REV. 65, 71-72 (1985).
100 See HUGHES, supra note 48, at 221-240.
2005] 1119
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
who makes and who is made ... It is not clear what is mind and what
body in machines that resolve into coding practices . . .There is no
fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of
machine and organisms, of technical and organic."'' I noted earlier
that enhancement technology use puts the meaning of the normative
boundaries into play. If gene therapy causes "foreign" genetic material
to be inserted into the nuclei of patient cells, thereby prompting those
cells to produce desired proteins, is the patient now producing that
protein "naturally"? If the material was synthetic, is the patient now a
cyborg? If the material was engineered using mouse DNA, is the
patient now a chimera?
In The Birthmark, Hawthorne tells us what disability rights
advocates have more recently claimed, that "defect" is in the eye of the
beholder and that one's humanity might be inextricably tied to the
"defect."' 10 2 His story also suggests that in marriage, as in society, it is
the beholder, not the "defective" who has the apparent power to define.
Hollywood insiders might agree with Hawthorne's insights. They
might also have something to say about how artificial standards of
beauty, however lacking in intrinsic value they may be, can become
simultaneously normal and abnormal, and always tyrannical. High tech
culture's challenges to modernist boundaries can expose both the
artifice and the tyranny of them.
Challenging the boundaries, exposing them as art and power,
can open space for claiming interpretive power. The timing for this
effort may be fortuitous.
The fight among modernists may not be, as it appears, only a
fight over the scope of autonomy or the true basis for human nature. It
may be viewed, as well, as a struggle for relevance. The vigor with
which proponents and critics engage the issues suggests, of course, that
enhancement technology use may have serious consequences. That
vigor may also indicate that the weapons are dull. The dispute over the
content and resiliency of human essence is being waged fiercely.
Dualisms depend on essentialisms. Essentialisms constitute both the
line and the justification for the line drawing. Biological race
101 Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REv. 65, 97 (1985).
102 Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability
Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 352, 355 (2000); Jeffery C. Kirby,
Disability and Justice: A Pluralistic Account, 30 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 229, 232-33
(2004); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043,
1051-54 (2004).
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reinscribes socially constructed race and reinforces the reason for
recognizing "race" in the first place. The lines that transhumanism's
possibilities blur put the stakes into question. If the central dualism,
self/other, cannot be maintained, then all of our boundaries may be
compromised.
This is not, as you might be thinking, a Matrix moment, when
the code comes tumbling down. But this might be a moment when the
defenses are thin, and a bit of code is exposed as such. The trick then is
to find and probe the complexities, the simultaneities, the ambiguities
in order to reveal that the simplicity and clarity wrought by modernist
analysis is constructed and confining. 10 3 Doing so, for example, could
make the social construction of "nature" obvious and unmistakable,
which in turn, could undermine genetic essentialism and genetic
determinism. 10
4
The Birthmark and The Island of Dr. Moreau both rely on
dualisms between human/inhuman and natural/unnatural. In those
stories, the dualisms hold strong and the points of transgression are
clear. H.G. Well's tale, in particular, contains little ambiguity. The
draw is the initial mystery for the narrator (and the reader) who visits
Dr. Moreau on his island, with no knowledge that Moreau has been
conducting surgical experiments to create cross-species hybrids. The
ultimate draw, however, is the horror that dawns as Dr. Moreau's
transgressions become known. In the context of the story, the
boundaries are difficult to challenge. Using the transhuman to probe
the boundaries, however, reveals their malleability. Consider the
patient who received gene therapy. Is her body now functioning
naturally or unnaturally? Does the insertion of genetic material that
includes mouse DNA make her less human? It is not the answers that
matter, but the questioning process.
In Bladerunner,10 5 the protagonist, Deckard, is a well-known
modernist archetype. He is the lone, autonomous underdog who is
employed by, but not servant to the powers that be. As a "blade
runner" Deckard tracks and kills genetically engineered replicants or
humanoids gone awry. Their transgression is that they want to be
human. The replicants have implanted memories that they hold dear
and a fierce desire to live. They evoke our sympathy and challenge the
biological essentialism in "human," in part because the social and
physical context depicted seems so inhumane. The story challenges
103 Haraway, supra note 99, at 82-84; LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS 63-70 (1996).
104 Shildrick, supra note 74, at 152.
105 BLADE RUNNER (Warner Studios 1982).
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Deckard and the reader to drop the boundary drawn by the
natural/artificial dualism and expand the definition of "human." The
other dualism of this movie, created by the "dueling" endings,
ironically reinforces the challenge. The initial release of the movie
featured an ending in which Deckard and Rachel, the replicant woman
he loves, fly away. Deckard's voiceover tells the viewer that Rachel
has no pre-set termination date. This indicates that she will live a
human life-span. The studio apparently preferred this happy ending
over the darker ending the director had planned. It also may be that this
ending is less disturbing. The lack of a pre-set termination date
humanizes Rachel, making her union with Deckard, who is
unquestionably human, more acceptable. The Director's Cut, released
years later, omits the voiceover, creating an ambiguous ending in which
Rachel's fate, and therefore Deckard's are unknown. A final image
suggests, but does not resolve the possibility that Deckard, too, might
be a replicant, thus asking the viewer to once again reconsider the
boundaries at play.
These accounts illustrate that we can deploy the figure of the
transhuman to challenge the social constructions that underpin
biological essentialism. Within a modernist framework, the obvious
move is to define a non-biological universal standard. Naam uses the
desire "to reach beyond our grasp" as the universal human essence.
Fukuyama sets out a claim of basic human values. Hughes asserts an
expansive understanding of personhood. The postmodernist's task is to
exploit the moment in which the boundaries are at play and to show
how the porousness of abstract criteria allows existing social
arrangements to replicate themselves. Bladerunner is, as told, a
modernist tale. But a postmodemist reading is always possible - One
could find a trait that makes the replicants human. For example, they
seek to reach beyond their grasp and live as humans. But, what makes
them seem so very human is their complexity, their distinct
personalities, their nuance, and their self-awareness that while they are
artificial and therefore doomed, they feel human.
Postscript: The Director's Cut was well-accepted. The general
popularity of director's cuts may explain this. It may be that the studio
was wrong about audience tolerance for ambiguity and not-happy
endings. It might also be the result of what Haraway calls the "ubiquity
and invisibility of cyborgs," and their resulting deadliness. 06 Some of
the transhumanist proponents imagine that there will be big, obvious
106 Haraway, supra note 99, at 71.
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moments when we have to make choices, and that those moments will
be defining. Haraway suggests the opposite, that those moments are
already passing, that they are silently redefining normativity. Perhaps
in the span of the movie, in the context of the story, the ubiquity and
the invisibility (of some) of the cyborgs shifted our normative
understanding of the human. We may already be living in a
transhuman world. If normative shifts occur so silently and quickly,
then we will not have noticed the change. Anticipating the shifts,
however, may open additional opportunities to intervene.
V. RACE AND HEALTH IN A POSTHUMAN WORLD
Dystopian possibilities
Imagining the dystopian possibilities seems relatively easy. Fukuyama
and others have already forecast the creation of a genetic overclass
formed by and for the existing overclass. Transhumanism proponent
James Hughes refers to this as the "X-Men mythos."' 0 7 By implication,
underclasses reinscribed on existing lines, including racism, would
form, as well. The legitimacy and perceived utility of biological race,
in other words, would ascend. In a culture that assigns relative value to
difference, genetic discrimination and eugenic choices would become
normalized. These practices would exacerbate the meaning assigned to
and the consequences of difference. This would, finally, naturalize
inequalities in health status and health care.
In this scenario, the boundary between human and nonhuman
holds fast. Humans continue to be seen as unique, autonomous beings
who can, as a simple act of will, overcome their "situations," including
those implicating race.108 The nonhuman is treated as an assimilated
part or as owned, patented, or otherwise controlled. Teresa Heffernan
refers to this process as cooptation. The result is domination of the
nonhuman. 1
09
While communities of color may be assigned to the human side
of the boundary, their underclass status may make them vulnerable to
exploitation and appropriation. Current practices suggest the
107 JAMES HUGHES, CITIZEN CYBORG: WHY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MUST RESPOND
TO THE REDESIGNED HUMAN OF THE FUTURE 75-106, 221-232 (2004) (describing a
citizenship-property schema as the crux of a "transhuman democracy," that changes
the existing distinction from human/nonhuman to persons/non-persons. Persons
includes humans and others with feelings and consciousness).
108 Heffernan, supra note 74, at 128.
109 Id.
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significance of these risks. Attempts to market products to particular
racial groups - e.g. BiDil - may legitimize biological race.'1 0 Efforts to
gather DNA fiom specific populations for commercial purposes creates
very real risk of exploitation and commodification.1 The same
practice on groups whose cultural frameworks make capital exchange
in or loss of control over genetic material immoral, unnatural, or
otherwise unacceptable depends on "the power of the west to override
contrary value systems.' 2 More generally, the use of contract, the
characterization of genetic material, embryos, gametes as commercial
products threatens to commodify those who "produce" them as well.
What these risks demonstrate is that technology development and use,
and the ways in which we rate the use, take place in contexts in which
racism operates as a harmful and divisive force."13 Science does not
disrupt, but incorporates racism's power, and then reciprocates.
The Hard Work of Hope
If we can use critical analysis to reveal ambiguity and complexity, and
to anticipate the silent, creeping normative shifts that could produce a
dystopia, then we must also be prepared to do something constructive
with the discursive space that we have made. This is the hard part. The
initial difficulty arises from the complicities formed, the pacts made in
order to do anti-racist work. The final hurdle is the difficulty of
imagining outside of our current social reality.
Race conscious analysis sometimes incorporates practices that
have implications for the role of biomedical science in our futures. One
problem is that of reflexive opposition. The problem is understandable.
For anti-racists, opposition often has been and continues to be the most
principled and effective strategy. Once the dystopian possibilities
emerge, logic seems to dictate opposition to transhumanism and to
transhumanism proponents. Well-founded suspicion of science and
technology may reinforce the oppositional reflex. That logic, however,
110 Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes "Ethnic": Law, Commerce, and the
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS
1, 35-38 (2004). See Rene Bowser, Race as a Proxy for Drug Response: The
Dangers and Challenges of Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1111, 1122-26 (2004);
Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in
Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391,474-79 (2004).
... See BRONWYN PARRY, TRADING THE GENOME: INVESTIGATING THE
COMMODIFICATION OF BIO-INFORMATION 12-41 (2004) (providing an analysis of how
objectification and commodification arises from collecting biological material).
112 Shildrick, supra note 74, at 161.
" See id. at 160.
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results from binary-bound thinking. The dystopian vision is not
inevitable. Nor is transhumanism necessarily an either/or proposition.
We already may be, as Donna Haraway suggests, living in a
transhumanist world. Furthermore, it is possible to both embrace
enhancement technology and social change. Direct opposition may
foreclose opportunities to intervene.
Assuming the position of critic, in opposition to proponents,
also may limit our power to intervene. The most powerful and likely
alliance among proponents is between libertarians and liberals. James
Hughes, in fact, has proposed a basis for that alliance.' 14 However,
when liberal pro-choice feminists courted libertarians in the fight
against parental consent requirements for abortion, the resulting
alliance moved the issue framing to the right. 15 The shift created a
short term political win, but a long term loss for the movement. 1 6 It
has negatively affected progressive feminists, including many women
of color. A libertarian-liberal alliance among transhumanism
proponents would not automatically produce the same result. But the
potential meld between operating rules premised on free market
individualism that dominate the health care and biotech industries, and
libertarianism indicates that the risk is real. Opposition from critics
would not prevent, and may actually enhance the shift to the right. The
strong position may actually be one that is independent, and not allied
to the traditional power brokers.
A second problem is that the racial identities we have claimed
for ourselves sometimes, perhaps often, place an "essence" at their
core. We assert our identities in response to those imposed on us.
Because of that, our claimed identities often reflect - as the result of
their oppositional formation - what we are rejecting. Thus, biological
race may have appeal because it seems to offer a basis for founding or
maintaining community, or because it provides a simpler explanation
for health status. Or, we may claim identity and community based on
what we posit is the shared experience of particular forms of
oppression. In doing so, we can cling so closely to certain accounts of
racial identity and racism that those whose identity and experience
deviate from those accounts are excluded from the group. Identity then
becomes a tool for policing the racial boundaries from within. This can
bolster or simply replicate the imposed racial boundaries, expanding
"' HUGHES, supra note 48, at 216-220.
1'5 See WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE
ABORTION WAR 57-83 (2003).
116 See SALETAN, supra note 67, at 84-107.
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the significance of racial difference.117 As many have now observed, it
can also isolate those defined by the intersection of race and other
subgroup status.' 18 Gay men and lesbians have experienced this
phenomenon. The excluded are placed at greater risk of inadequate
health care access and quality of care. 119 The appeal of community
formation and the way identity feels, as a lived experience, make it
difficult to reject a positive, but essentialized identity. But
essentialized identity is inaccurate and excluding, no matter who claims
it.
Postmodern analysis points to the necessity of continuous
intervention and continuous reassessment of the possibilities.
Rejecting reflexive opposition means recusal from intervention
premised on anti-science, anti-technology viewpoints and refusal to
participate in anti-science, anti-technology knowledge work. 120 Past
uses of biological race, racist eugenics, immigration restrictions,
quarantines, race-based expoitation as in the Tuskegee Syphilis
Experiment, race, culture and language-based barriers to health care
access, and the role of racism in unequal health care may make recusal
difficult to swallow. Staking out the "natural" or "organic" position
may be tempting. We can, however, challenge racism in health care
and biomedical research without taking an anti-science stance.
Haraway and sociologist Stanley Aronowitz both call for
"taking responsibility for the social relations of science and
technology."'121 This is harder than oppositional work. For Haraway, it
means "embracing the skillful task of reconstructing the boundaries of
everyday life, in partial connection with others, in communication with
all of our parts.' ' 122 For Aronowitz it means building "a new scientific
citizenship in which democratic forms of decision making were shared
between the scientific community and the public.'1 2 3 He cites the
example of ACT-UP.
117 This may be particularly true of biological race.
118 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STANFORD L. REv. 581, 588-89 (1990).
119 CATHERINE WALDBY, AIDS AND THE BODY POLITIC: BIOMEDICINE AND SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 103-05 (1996); Paula A. Treichler, AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical
Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL
ACTIVISM 44-45 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988).
120 See Haraway, supra note 99, at 100.
121 Id. at 100.
122 id.
123 Stanley Aronowitz, The Politics of the Science Wars, in SCIENCE WARS, supra
note 3, at 202, 223 (emphasis in original).
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"ACT-UP, an organization of gay and straight activists
concerned with the spread of the AIDS epidemic began
by demanding more funds for AIDS research and now
intervenes in scientific disputes as to the best treatment for
the disease. By force of circumstance as much as by
conscious knowledge, it was obliged to question many of
the precepts of its own membership, namely, that the doctor
knows best. Gradually, members became sophisticated in
many areas of the history and philosophy of science.
Imagine a polity capable of challenging the uses and truth
claims of scientific and technological research."'
' 24
What Haraway and Aronowitz recognize is that postmodernism can
only establish political relevance by political organizing.
The Center for Genetics and Society (CGS) provides a more
recent example of how the work of intervention and reassessment can
be accomplished in a politically relevant way. Longtime progressive
activists formed CGS in 2001 "to stimulate debate on the social justice
implications of new genetic technologies,"'' 25 and look for ways to
"allow legitimate medical research to proceed, but draw the line against
this new techno-eugenics."'' 26 The CGS mission statement says that
"[t]he Center supports benign and beneficent medical applications of
the new human genetic and reproductive technologies, and opposes
those applications that objectify and commodify human life and
threaten to divide human society."' 27 Since 2004, CGS has questioned
the terms and implementation of California's Proposition 71, the
California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. Passage of
Proposition 71 established the California Institute of Regenerative
Medicine. The ballot measure also provided for $3 billion in funding
for stem cell research at institutions within the state and a 29-member
governing board for the Institute. Initially, CGS stood practically
alone, raising questions about governing board conflicts of interest, the
lack of legislative oversight and accountability to the public, the need
for measures to protect potential egg donors from exploitation and
124 Aronowitz, supra note 3, at 223.
125 Tali Woodward, Best of the Bay 2005: Local Heroes, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, July
27, 2005, at 62.
126 Id. at 62 (quoting co-founder, with Marcy Darnovsky, and Executive Director
Richard Hayes).
127 Center For Genetics and Society, About Us, http://www.genetics-and-
society.org/about/ (last visited July 30, 2005).
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unjustified health risks, and the desirability of making potential
research benefits available to all. Since the bill became effective,
January 1, 2005, public officials, the mainstream news media, and other
community-based organizations joined CGS in the intervention
process. The Institute has, in many ways, responded to the concerns
being raised. What the public is learning is that, despite what the anti-
science social conservatives say, this is not all about the embryo wars;
this is about the potential of biomedical research to develop
technologies that could impair the health and status of women and
people of color even as it improves the health of others.
The California public has not yet learned to see how the
commercial nature of science and technology may have already shifted
normativity. The greatest concern is not that transhumanism is already
here. The greatest concern is that commodification has already
subsumed much of identity, and what is being lost is not autonomy, but
subjectivity. While the intermediate effect - the normative shift - is
intangible, the means for accomplishing these shifts are concrete. They
include, for example, the conduct of medical procedures such as ova
collection and DNA collection as wholly commercial exchanges.
Aronowitz's hope for a polity capable of challenging the truth claims
and uses of science and technology must be expanded. Citizens also
must be able to question the claims and uses of the commercial
practices of the science and technology industries. Scientific
citizenship must include democratic forms of decision making that are
shared, and are based on principles and mechanisms of mutual
accountability by the public, the state, and industry. Postmodern
analysis has tended to yield either dystopic vision or "crypto-
idealism."' 128  What is also needed is vigilance for material
consequences. 1
29
VI. CONCLUSION
Earlier I stated that race is back. Anti-racist efforts to address health
care inequalities have shown, in fact, that racism never left. But as a
subject of legitimate biomedical research, race is indeed back. The
concern, of course, is that the investigation of race will reproduce a
powerful form of biological race. The confluence of biological race
128 Joel Kovel, Dispatches from the Science Wars, in SCIENCE WARS, supra note 3, at
200.
129 Id. at 200 (predicting a more materialist turn in postmodernist critique as it grows
under the pressures of the present conjunction.").
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and other genetic essentialisms, the ideological power of the gene, and
normalization in-progress of genetic selection already suggests that
eugenics is near.
The possibilities of enhancement technology use will, according
to some, magnify the risk and the effects of a new eugenic era. Others
argue that enhancement technology use is our obligation and our right.
Their vision of the future is brighter, and apparently race-less.
Carefully tended boundaries maintain that illusion. But those
boundaries are malleable. When subject to transhumanism's challenges,
the complexities show and ambiguities dangle.
More than thirty years ago, The Six Million Dollar Man gave us
a model transhuman. He was not a loner, an underdog, or an anti-hero.
He was a quintessentially 1970s era modernist hero. The backstory
placed him squarely within the mythology of the intrepid explorer. He
was a former astronaut, a test pilot nearly killed in a crash. After the
government invested $6 million dollars to replace his damaged parts
with experimental bionic ones, he acquired superpowers. He became
faster, stronger, and could see further. As an agent for the Office of
Scientific Investigation, he fought injustice on a weekly basis. In
2005, the predictive power of this show derives not from the tagline -
"we can make him better ... faster . . . stronger." It comes from the
title, which defined him first and foremost in terms of his price tag.
Biopower's silent partner is capital exchange. Whatever
mechanisms we use to challenge the boundaries must not only expose
the interactions between science and culture, but also those between
science and industry. Discursive analysis made relevant by political
organizing is one possible starting point. In a complex world, there
must be many pressure points. Our efforts must be persistent, adaptive,
and trained on material effects as well as normative shifts, even after
the code comes tumbling down.
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